![]() 30 November and 1 December – Fort Bonifacio and Villamor Air BaseĪt about the same time that two rebel Marine companies, supported by three LVTs and two V-150s, launched an attack on VAB, three companies of the First Scout Ranger Regiment (FSRR) occupied the FSRR Headquarters (HQ), surrounded and secured the Army Operations Center (AOC), almost capturing the Commanding General of the Philippine Army (CG PA) in the process, and thereafter took over the rest of Fort Bonifacio without encountering any significant resistance. The Makati business district appears to have been outside the initial plan.Ī.3.b. These targets, picked in accordance with the aforementioned strategic principles, were: Fort Bonifacio, Villamor Air Base (VAB) together with the Domestic and International Airports, Camp Aguinaldo, Channels 2 and 4, Sangley Point, Mactan Air Base (MAB), MalacafSang, and North and South Harbors. Nonetheless, despite this false start, rebel ground and air forces commenced hostilities against their pre-chosen targets almost simultaneously in the late evening of 30 November and in the very early morning of 1 December. This mission was not supposed to take place until 30 November, since it was meant to signal D-Day forthe 1 December coup. The failed December 1989 coup began inauspiciously on 29 November 1989, when a Scout Ranger team prematurely destroyed the AFP communications station in Tagaytay. The activities of the government, on the other hand, consisted of monitoring the various moves of the conspirators and of taking such preventive action as was possible under the circumstances. Individual efforts at recruitment, such as those conducted by Lt Col Tiburcio Fusilero in Cebu and other parts in the south, were taking place in various units of the Armed Forces. An alliance between the RAM-HF (Honasan Faction) and the Loyalists (Zumel Group) was forged at this time. Galido also had meetings during this period with, among others, Cherry Cobarrubias, Enrique Cojuangco, and Luis Tabuena. The major players, ex-Lt Col Gregorio Honasan, BGen Edgardo Abenina, ex-BGen Jose Ma Zumel, 1 and others, met frequently with BGen Alejandro Galido, who was reportedly then acting as a deep penetration agent for Gen Renato de Villa, Chief of Staff Armed Forces of the Philippines (CSAFP). These sources indicate that by at least the first garter of 1989, an extensive conspiracy amongst the coup plotters was in motion. The Commission has, therefore, included in this chapter a report on Pre-coup activities (both the rebels’ and the government’s) as gathered “rough direct testimonies, sworn statements, affidavits, exhibits, and intelligence reports. The strategy, the propaganda, the recruitment, the logistics, and every move necessary for the success of the coup must be set beforehand. The planning stage of a coup is thus of crucial importance. Such a strategy, however, calls for the total commitment of all the coup forces at one time.Īs pointed out in Chapter I, in a coup there is no opportunity to change strategy and tactics, replace weapons and men, or correct errors and omissions. The basic assumption behind the launching of a coup is that a concerted attack conducted with speed, surprise, and surgical precision against key facilities of a government in crisis, actual or perceived, will cause its immediate collapse. ![]() The Commission hopes this will help him link one event with the others which occurred in different places at the same time.Ī.1. ![]() The illustrations on page 259 show the battle sites during the December 1989 coup. This overview gives the reader the broad picture, like a road map in a manner of speaking. ![]() This chapter deals with the events associated with thefailed December 1989 coup attempt in great detail. THE FAILED DECEMBER 1989 COUP: PRE-COUP EVENTS AND BATTLE ZONE NARRATIVES
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